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This thesis attempts to analyze and measure the rela-
tionship between defense contractor risk and rate of return.
An historical perspective is gained through an extensive
review of significant legislation, studies, and policy
changes related to this topic. The government contracting
environment and the associated risks are examined from the
perspectives of both the government and contractors . The
nature of risk and methods of risk analysis are investigated
Empirical analysis of the defense contractor risk-return
relationship is performed utilizing four methods : mean-
variance analysis of rate of return, the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, mean-variance analysis of total and govern-
ment backlog, and mean-variance analysis of Five-Year
Defense Program elements. Emphasis is placed on investi-
gating the feasibility of adapting Gloria Hurdle's Leverage,
Risk, Market Structure and Profitability Model to evaluate
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
Over the past thirty-five years numerous defense con-
tractor profitability and risk studies have been conducted.
The basic premise of these studies has been to examine the
profitability of defense industry firms in comparison with
commercial firms. They sought to answer the questions?
Are defense contractor profits excessive, thereby wasting
our national resources? Are profit rates too low, thereby
jeopardizing our defense industrial base? Previous studies
have been widely criticized for biased premises, nonrepre-
sentative samples, inaccurate data, and misleading varia-
tions in statistical averages. The most recent significant
study, the Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
,
chartered as a result of Grace Commission recommendations
for further study of contract pricing, financing, and profit
policies, attempted to minimize those difficulties for which
previous studies were criticized [Ref. 1] . None of the
prior studies has totally reconciled the fact that rates
of return are not completely comparable for having been
earned under varying exposures to risk. Rather than ask
what defense contractors' observed rates of return are, a
more appropriate question would be whether defense contrac-
tors are appropriately rewarded for creative and wise risk
10
taking. This is a complex and contentious issue. One
problem has been the lack of 'generally accepted methods for
the evaluation and quantification of defense contractor
risk.
The purpose of this thesis is to empirically analyze
four possible methods for the evaluation and quantification
of defense contractor risks. First, the most commonly used
method, mean-variance analysis of rate of return, is ex-
amined. Average risk-adjusted rates of return for a sample
of 49 defense contractors, a sub-sample of 36 commercially-
oriented contractors, and a sub-sample of 13 DOD-oriented
contractors are obtained. Then the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) is tested with regard to the same three sample
groups of contractors. The "third method is mean-variance
analysis of both total and government backlog for the same
three sample groups of contractors . The fourth method is
mean-variance analysis of Five-Year Defense Program elements
B. OVERVIEW
Analysis of government contractor risk and the inter-
relationship of that risk with other variables is complex.
Consequently, a broad-view approach is adopted in order to
form a basis for further study.
Essential to a study such as this is an appreciation for
previous work on the topic. Thus, in Chapter II we explore
the most significant legislation, studies, and policies
11
which address government contractor profitability and risk.
The amount of literature available on this and related
topics is vast. However, much of it is redundant and
focuses on comparing defense contractor profits with those
of comparable commercial firms. A relatively small amount
of work has been performed in the area of profit, risk,
financing, and market structure relationship analysis. The
recent Defense Financial and Investment Review points us in
this direction with the suggestion that we integrate these
policies for the Department of Defense.
Armed with an historical perspective, a full understand-
ing of government contracting issues from the view of both
the government and the contractor would be a logical next
step. Therefore, Chapter III examines . these government
contracting issues
.
Because the concept of risk is complex and relationships
between risk and other variables are not always clear,
Chapter IV investigates the concept of risk, emphasizing
basics. Chapter IV also addresses government and contractor
concerns regarding risk.
Chapter V attempts to empirically assess four measures
of risk for possible future inclusion in a model to eval-
uate risk-return relationships among defense contractors
.
Variability of return on net worth, stock prices, backlog,
and RSD program funding are the measures which are analyzed.
12
Particular emphasis is given to possible development of
a model integrating profit, risk, financing, and market
structure, as suggested by DFAIR, for defense contractors.
13
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
This chapter explores the genesis of defense contracting
profit policy. Of particular interest in this investigation
is the study of the variability of returns and the risk
versus return relationship.
A. VINSON-TRAMMEL ACT
Accusations of war profiteering have plagued defense
contractors since the days of the Revolutionary War, Some
accusations have been justified. However, it was not until
1934 when the Senate held the highly publicized "Nye
Hearings," an investigation of a chemical company that
earned $248 million net before taxes on $1.2 billion
military sales from 1915 to 1918, that legislation was
considered. The first attempt to legislate profit came
in the form of the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 which limited
profit on contracts for ships and aircraft to 10 percent
and 12 percent, respectively. The act required contractors
to return all profits in excess of those limits . Whether
the post World War I profiteering scandals affected the
corporate strategies of defense contractors or not
,
Dr. Weidenbaum observes:
A fundamental change in the relationship between shooting
war and military profits seems to have occurred since the
beginning of the twentieth century. Although the
14
production of weapons for a military buildup can be
quite profitable, all objective measurements point to
the -fact that business profitability declines "during an
actual war. Corporate profits declined as a share of
national income during World War II and the wars in Korea
and Vietnam. [Ref. 2:p. 67]
He also observes
:
Peacetime military expansions are quite another matter.
When the U.S. was mobilizing its "arsenal for democracy"
from 1939 to 1941, the American economy was climbing out
of the depression; corporate profits (even after taxes)
almost doubled, from $5.6 billion in 1939 to $10.1
billion in 1941. This upturn in company earnings ended
with Pearl Harbor, however. Although the GNP almost
doubled from 1941 to 1945, corporate profits after
taxes declined to $9 billion in 1945 (the drop was far
more substantial in "real" terms). Following the massive
reduction in military spending after the war, corporate
profits rose to $23 billion in 1948. A similar relation-
ship held before and during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
[Ref. 2:p. 68]
B. ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT ACT
After the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934, the next signifi-
cant legislation came in the form of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947. This was enacted to regulate
Department of Defense (DOD) procurement. It provided the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) to implement
the requirements of the act. A major requirement of this
act was to utilize formal advertising as the basic method
of government procurement except when conditions fell
within one or more of 17 exemptions permitting use of
negotiation as the method of procurement. In procurement
by formal advertising, contractors are invited to submit
bids for goods and services. The responsive and responsible
15-
contractor with the lowest bid is awarded the contract. In
procurement by negotiation, contracts can be awarded com-
petitively or noncompetitively and discussion of proposals
is permitted. [Ref . 3]
C. RENEGOTIATION ACT
The next significant legislation was the Renegotiation
Act of 1951. This was enacted to eliminate contractors'
excessive profits on defense and space contracts and sub-
contracts. The Renegotiation Board, an independent agency,
was created by the act to administer the program. The act
required all contracts of $100,000.00 or more to contain a
renegotiation clause which could be invoked by the DOD
component department secretary. The Renegotiation Board
was empowered to require contractors to return profits it
considered excessive. The Renegotiation Act was extended
twelve times between 1951 and 1975 but was allowed to expire
by Congress on December 31, 1975. Congress decided at that
time that the provisions of the act were a costly adminis-
trative burden on reporting firms, tended to penalize
smaller contractors, and were no longer needed. Opposing
views regarding renegotiation are characterized by the
following studies: The Comptroller General's Report to
the Congress, Causes of Excessive Profits on Defense and
Space Contracts
,
puts forth the following proposition:
Contracts resulting in excess profits were negotiated,
as well as formally advertised. The required price or
16
cost analyses were made- before the contracts were
negotiated. Most excessive profits were caused by a
seller's market which lessened competition and let
prices increase. When contractors' volume rose, fre-
quently unit production costs were reduced and profits
were increased. Excessive profits were not caused to
any great extent by inadequate procurement procedures
or poor implementation of procedures by Government
procurement officials. Implementation of good procure-
ment procedures will not necessarily prevent excessive
profits. Renegotiation is needed as long as the Congress
intends to recover excessive profits on procurements for
national defense. [Ref. 4]
The Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR) puts
forth an opposing view:
The DOD position has been that the best approach to avoid-
ing excess profits is good pricing. Given an adequate
number of well-trained contracting officers with support-
ing field auditors and pricing personnel, and with the
protection provided by the Truth in Negotiations Act and
fraud statutes, there is no reason why excess profits
should be a significant problem. Cost accounting
standards have superseded the allocation disputes which
were the heart of many of the Renegotiation Board's
findings of excess profits. Finally, good pricing has
the advantage of encouraging cost control, because a
contractor must underrun tight costs to earn a high
profit. The renegotiation approach, on the other hand,
would tend to encourage contractors to attempt to increase
costs on profitable contracts , rather than to cut costs
still further. [Ref. l:pp. VU-V5]
The DFAIR view appears to be more appropriate as evidenced
by recent contractor suspensions resulting from Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits [Ref. 5].
D. WEIGHTED GUIDELINES
On January 1, 1964 the first uniform, systematic
approach to developing profit policy objectives for
negotiated contracts, entitled Weighted Guidelines (WGL)
,
became effective. This method, although changed several
17
times since implementation, was and still is used by
contract negotiators to provide rewards commensurate with
contractor effort; contractor risk; facilities investment;
and special factors such as productivity, independent
development, and other special factors applicable under
the original directive, ASPR Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR) 3-808. This regulation provided a structured approach
to analysis of contractors' cost input, cost risk, past
performance, as well as other pertinent factors,
Table 1 lists the factors considered in cases where
cost analysis is used to arrive at a negotiated contract
price together with corresponding weight ranges. Table 1
also summarizes changes to the markup policy which have
occurred since implementation. -Specific weight percentages
are now assigned in accordance with criteria set forth in
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), DOD Supplement
15.9. The cost of each subfactor is multiplied by this
percentage to arrive at the profit objective for that
particular effort. The sum of the individual profit objec-
tives yields an overall contract profit objective.
Since its implementation in 1964, the WGL method has
been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. Criticized
initially for being too subjective, the WGL method has
proven itself capable of at least providing similar profit
objectives for similar contracts. The fact that the WGL
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Because profit is calculated as a percentage of cost, some
argue that contractors are induced to keep costs high.
Others contend that , because contractors operate within
Return on Investment (ROD and Return on Equity (ROE)
strategies, the government's cost-based approach is not
realistic. These and similar controversies were the initial
sparks setting off the wave of "profit studies" which soon
followed. [Ref. 6]
E. LMI, WEIDENBAUM, AND GAO STUDIES
In 1967 Senator William Proxmire (D, Wis.), Chairman,
Joint Economic Committee was grappling with claims of war
profiteering. Senator Proxmire obtained secret reports
which the Pentagon used to annually review negotiated profit
rates. He compared data from two periods 1959-1963 and
1964-1967 and discovered a 22 percent increase in profit
rates between the two periods. DOD cited a Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) study, Defense Industry Profit
Review Task 66-25, November 1967 [Ref. 7], in an attempt
to demonstrate that while negotiated profits did increase,
actually realized profits did not.
This LMI study examined financial data from 1958 to
1966 for 65 defense contractors. It compared profits on
defense business with those on commercial business for the
65 contractors. Comparisons with profits of similar
commercial manufacturing contractors were also made. The
21
LMI study found that there was a general downward trend in
defense business profitability, an upward trend in the
profitability of commercial business, and average profits
were lower on defense business than on commercial business.
Defense contractor average profits were found to be lower
than average profits for similar commercial manufacturing
contractors. Critics of the LMI study immediately identi^-
fied a major flaw in' the data collection method. That is,
only companies who volunteered data were used, thereby
excluding companies with high rates of return.
Also in 1967, Dr. Weidenbaum compared six large defense
contractors (defense work accounted for at least 75 percent
of total sales) with six commercial firms having similar
sales volume, over two four-year periods, 1952-1955
o
and
1962-1965 [Ref. 8]. He concluded that while defense-oriented
firms had a lower return on sales, they had a greater return
on net worth than the commercial firms had. For the
1962-1965 period the defense contractors had a 17.5 percent
return on investment (ROD while commercial firms for the
same period had a 10.6 percent ROI . These returns were
lower than the 1952-1955 period but the spread was wider.
Dr. Weidenbaum attributed this disparity to the fact that
the defense contractors had a higher capital turnover rate




Critics claimed that Dr. Weidenbaum's data was limited
and that his sample size was too small. However, this
study was significant in that it was one of the first
studies to relate these higher returns to investor risk.
Dr. Weidenbaum, in referring to his 1967 study, "Arms and
the American Economy: A Domestic Convergence Hypothesis",
states :"
The stock and bond market evaluation has generally been
less favorable of the large specialized defense contrac-
tors than of other business firms; the defense contractors'
stocks usually sell at lower prices than stocks of other
companies with similar earnings, and their bonds generally
have lower ratings, denoting greater investor risk. This
is caused in part by the instability of the military
market and the uncertain future of specific firms. The
experiences of firms like Lockheed in the period since
1965 show that for the individual company the profitabil-
ity of military work may be fleeting. [Ref. 2:p. 68]
Another significant study conducted in 1967 was Fisher
and Hall's Risk and the Aerospace Rate of Return [Ref. 9].
They addressed the question of whether the above-average
rate of return on net worth earned by 8 8 aerospace firms
for the period 1957-1964 resulted from above-average risk
exposure. Fisher and Hall's development of a method for
obtaining risk-comparable corporate rates of return was a
pioneering work in this area. Significant results produced
by Fisher and Hall were, on the basis of reasonable assump-
tions, to measure the risk component of corporate profits
and to determine that the aerospace rate of return remained
the second highest even after adjusting for risk. They
caution, however, that profits are affected by many more
23
factors than risk. And they emphasize the fact that they
isolated the risk factor for purposes of this study.
In 1969, LMI continued its 1967 study. This time they
used total capital investment (TCI) as the base of their
profitability measure. LMI found that average defense
profit as a percent of TCI trended downward while average
commercial firm profits trended upward. They concluded
that profit inequitie's exist because differences in capital
requirements are not reflected in defense profit rates and
they recommend that capital requirements be given greater
consideration in negotiated contract profit determinations
.
[Ref, 10]
The 1970 continuation of the LMI Defense Industry Profit
Review
,
based on 1958-1968 data, supported findings of the
1967 and 1969 studies [Ref. 11]. That is, there is a low
average profit on defense business as compared with commer-
cial business, profit inequities exist as a result of
different capital requirements, and there is an increased
capability of defense contractors to compete in commercial
markets
.
As a result of the mixed results from previous studies
,
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress holding hearings
on the Acquisition of Weapons systems in 1969 directed the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to make an independent study
of the subject of defense profits in depth. GAO examined
profits on negotiated contracts and subcontracts with DOD
,
24
NASA, and the Coast Guard. Profits of 74 large contractors,
61 small contractors, and 10 subcontractors were compared on
the basis of return on sales, return on equity capital, and
return on total capital investment. Results of GAO ' s study,
published in 1971 [Ref. 12], were: return on sales before
taxes on defense work was 4.3 percent compared to 9.9 percent
for commercial work, return on total capital investment was
11.2 percent for defense work compared to 14 percent for
commercial work, and return on equity capital was 21.1 per-
cent for defense work compared to 2 2.9 percent for commer-
cial work. Dr. Weidenbaum notes three important distinctions
made in the GAO study:
- Prime contractors show a higher return on investment on
military work than do companies that specialize in sub-
contracts (only 15 percent for the latter). In part,
the difference is accounted for by the fact that the
prime contractors pass very little of the progress
payments they receive from the government on to their
subcontractors. Also, the subcontractors obtain very
little in the way of government-owned facilities, which
tend to be concentrated among the prime contractors
.
- Large defense contractors show a higher profit rate on
military work than do smaller companies (21 percent as
compared to 11 percent). Again, the latter receive very
little government capital.
- Aerospace and also ammunition companies show a much
higher profitability on defense work than do other
military contractors. Their profits on defense work
are also higher than the profits on their commercial
sales. The aerospace firms show an average 2 8 percent
return on investment for defense work, compared to an
18 percent return for commercial work. These companies
are more oriented to military work than the other indus-
tries that compete for military business. [Ref. 2:p. 69]
25
The GAO study settled nothing. Critics and supporters con-
tinued to disagree.
During this same timeframe, the Aerospace Industries
Association of America, Inc. (AIA) performed a thorough
examination of the nature of risk involved in government
contracting. The results of their study, Risk Elements in
Government Contracting [Ref. 13], consist of eleven key
areas of risk which were identified and subjectively
assessed: contract type, warranties and related liabilities,
ultra-hazardous work indemnification, disallowance of costs,
funding, termination, cost or pricing data, contract
breaches, facilities investment, patents and technical data,
and management systems and controls. Another AIA study,
Aerospace Profits vs. Risks [Ref. 14], investigated the
adequacy of aerospace profits from 1966-1969. AIA addressed
the risk-return relationship. But they provided no empiri-
cal evidence to substantiate their conclusions that the
riskiness of aerospace work had increased as a result of an
increase in production risk and an obvious shift of risk
from the government to the contractor.
Unable to reconcile the shortcomings in the LMI
,
Weidenbaum, and GAO studies, Bohi constructed a sample of
36 defense contractors for analysis from 1960 through 1969
[Ref. 15]. His comparisons of return on net worth with the
Fortune "500" largest manufacturers yielded the findings
that profit performance between defense firms and commercial
26
manufacturing firms was not significantly different; there
was no apparent relationship between percentage of defense
business and profit performance; the Weidenbaum "domestic
convergence hypothesis" that defense business is becoming
more concentrated in the traditional defense firms and that
these defense firms are becoming increasingly dependent on
defense business was not supported; and profit rates for the
36 defense firms and 'the Fortune "500" manufacturers in-
creased during the Vietnam war period but the increase was
due to nondefense business. Bohi concluded:
On the basis of the sample of 36 defense contractors
considered here, it is concluded that there is no
evidence for arguing that defense business is any more
or less profitable than nondefense business in general.
Whether or not this result implies that defense profits
are too high or too low depends, of course, on the rela-
tive risk and relative efficiency of defense and non-
defense business. The current public debate has
abstracted from these issues and concentrated on
comparisons of profit performance. It appears,
however, that relative risk and relative efficiency,
not relative profit performance, are the important
issues. [Ref. 15:p. 728]
F. DEFENSE PROCUREMENT CIRCULAR 10 7
In 1972 DOD issued Defense Procurement Circular (DPC)
107 in order to correct perceived inequities in the WGL
method. Factors were added to base part of the profit
objective on operating capital and facilities capital
utilized in contract performance. DPC 107 was implemented
on a voluntary, trial basis to compensate contractors for
use of capital and to move toward a return on investment
27
approach. However in 1975 after only one contractor opted
to utilize the DPC 107 method, DPC 107 was withdrawn. Con-
tractors believed profits would not increase, that the
procedures were overly complex, and that it would penalize
contractors with little capital investment. [Ref. l:p. VI]
G. CARROLL STUDY
Carroll's 1972 study, "Profits in the Airframe Industry"
[Ref. 16], analyzed return on invested capital with attention
given to intra- and interindustry comparisons and to the
effect of risk for eight airframe manufacturers from 1957-
1966. Government-oriented companies had mean returns of 15.6
percent and a standard deviation of 2.08 compared to the air-
liner producers with a mean of 9.3 and standard deviation of
10.08. Risky government contracting in the sense of highly
volatile returns was not evident from these • results . Quite
the opposite, high profits did not correlate to high vola-
tility in earnings. Investigation of debt-to-equity ratios
for commercial and government firms indicated that leverage
was similar to that existing in comparable manufacturing
industries. Therefore, leverage did not account for the
substantial defense contractor earnings premiums. Carroll
concluded
:
Two distinct markets provide the bulk of demand for the
industry's product. The government sector is essentially
a bilateral monopoly, while the commercial airliner area
is a tight bilateral oligopoly. To gain insight into the
source of profits for the industry, these two markets must
28
be considered separately. When this is done, starkly
different patterns emerge for the two sectors. First,
the commercial market exhibits an endemic instability
with subcompetitive levels of profit. More important,"
as will be evident, supercompetitive returns have been
customary in the government airframe business and have .
further, provided an implicit subsidy to the commercial
airliner market. [Ref. 16:pp. 545-562]
H. POIRIER AND GARBER STUDY
In an October 1974 Southern Economic Journal article
titled "The Determinants of Aerospace Profit Rates 1951-
1971" [Ref. 17], Poirier and Garber respecify a linear
regression model developed by Agapos and Gallaway and test
the following hypotheses
:
(1) The level of capacity utilization is directly related
to the level of federal government spending. High
levels of such expenditures will reduce excess
capacity and thus reduce the need to be awarded any
single contract. This reduced need will be trans-
lated into greater bargaining strength and greater
realized profit rates.
(2) Conditions of war should be accompanied by a greater
sense of urgency on the part of government agencies
and thus a reduction of bargaining strength of the
government vis-a-vis contractors. This may be
expected to result in higher realized profits for
government contractors. iRef. 17:pp. 228-238]
Empirical results of the model for nine airframe manufac-
turers for the period 1951-1971 were different from those
obtained by Agapos and Gallaway. By breaking down defense
spending into components, Poirier and Garber found space
and RSD expenditures positively correlated with profit rates
Procurement expenditures were found to be negatively corre-
lated with profit rates. By representing time with a
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linear spline function they found that such a representation
explained a significant proportion of the residual variation
of profit rates and it allowed for separation of effects of
war and peace. This study concurs with the 1967 Rand
Corporation study conducted by Fisher and Hall, Risk and
the Aerospace Rate of Return
, which noted that several
adjustments were required to obtain empirical relationships
that coincided with theoretical concepts. Specifically,




In her November 1974 paper, "Leverage, Risk, Market
Structure and Profitability" [Ref. 18], Gloria Hurdle
attempted to analyze and measure the relationships among
leverage, market structure, risk and profitability by
developing a three-simultaneous-equation multiple regression
model and testing it. She tested the model using data
developed by Shepherd for 2 31 large U.S. manufacturing firms
covering the period 1960-1969. [Ref. 19] A second test was
made using a sample developed by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) consisting of data from 8 5 minor manufacturing
industries covering the period 1959-1967. [Ref, 20]
Hurdle theorized that since the relationships among risk,
earnings, and leverage depend on the utility functions of
firms, they must be determined empirically. Consequently,
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in her model, she used the following three dependent
variables: risk, financial structure, and rate of return.
Her initial hypothesis was that the deviation in rate of
return could be used to measure total risk.
1 . Risk Equation
The results which Hurdle obtained from her risk
equation were statistically significant. The signs of her
regression coefficients fit most of her a priori expecta-
tions. She found that firms with a large market share had
the advantage of lower profit variation. She found the
same to be true for advertising intensive firms. These
results were consistent with her hypotheses.
The finding that capital intensive firms, that is
firms with large assets to sales ratios , appeared to have
more stable profits was contrary to expectation. She
explains
:
A plausible explanation for the negative coefficient is
that the existence of large fixed costs forces the firm
to be cautious and strive for stable profits over time,
contrary to Scherer's expectation. iRef. 18 :p. 481]
Scherer expected the coefficient sign of the assets/sales
variable to be positive since he theorized that capital
intensive firms would be more likely to engage in price
cutting. [Ref. 21]
The coefficient sign of the concentration variable
also went against expectation. Hurdle expected that if her
concentration variable measured tightness of an oligopoly
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then it should represent the ability of a firm to control
price and therefore would have a negative coefficient. She
explains the positive coefficient she obtained:
An oligopoly group may have a higher rate of return, but
with more variability.
Industry demand affected profit variability as
expected. That -is, large demand fluctuations were related
to large profit variations
.
Finding the coefficient of the debt variable to be
statistically insignificant supported her a priori expecta-
tion that debt is an inappropriate measure of business risk.
Hurdle concludes from her risk equation:
These results indicate that market structure does play
a part in determining the size of profit deviations.
Firms with a large market share, with large advertising
expenditures, and with high assets tend to stabilize their
high level of profits over time. [Ref. 18 :p. 482]
2 . Debt Equation
Hurdle expected all the market structure variables
in the debt equation to have coefficient signs opposite of
the signs found in the risk equation. This was because she
theorized that variables which lowered risk should increase
the opportunity for high debt. Her results indicated that
firms with large market share preferred lower debt.
Her concentration variable, negatively related to
debt while positively related to risk, supports her theory.
Her capital intensity variable also supports her theory that
variables which lowered risk increased debt.
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Hurdle explains the negative profit coefficient she
obtained amid conflicting expectations
:
First, if one believes the "risk premium" argument, then
one would associate high profits with high risk and claim
that tt in this equation is acting as a partial proxy for
risk. In other words, those firms with high profits are
deemed risky by investors. Second, even if the firm's
view of risk corresponds to the measured risk, a, the
coefficient may reflect the choice of the firm based on
its utility function. [Ref. 18 :p. 483]
The size variable had the same sign in both the
risk and debt equations. Hurdle argues that large firms
behave like firms with a large market share preferring lower
risk to increased profits possibly because of antitrust
action
.
The growth variable exhibited the expected positive
sign. This supports the theory that expanding firms require
higher leverage.
The profit variation coefficient was found to be
statistically insignificant. The standard errors of the
regression coefficients in the debt equation were large.
Therefore, any conclusions would be weak statistically.
Hurdle concludes:
There is some evidence that large firms and/or firms with
large market shares are not taking advantage of their
ability to increase profits through higher debt, and thus,
as the theory suggests, are being more cautious or are
accepting lower risk. [Ref. 18:p. 483]
3 . Profit Equation
The coefficients of the debt and risk variables of
the profit equation yielded conflicting results under
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ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares. However
Hurdle does conclude that a firm with high debt has a high-
er return on equity.
The risk coefficient supports the risk premium
hypothesis. That is, a firm must have higher profit in
order to take on more risk.
4 . Industry Sample
Because of the conflicting results obtained from
the profit equation, Hurdle analyzed a second sample con-
sisting of 85 minor manufacturing industries. As a result
of this industry analysis, Hurdle was able to reject the
hypothesis that debt could be used to measure risk.
J. PROFIT '76
DOD became increasingly aware that its profit policy,
Weighted Guidelines, based on cost estimates, discouraged
contractor investment and rewarded high cost. Consequently,
on May 13, 1975 Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
directed that a full-scale study of DOD profit policy be
conducted. Secretary Clement's goal was to develop profit
policy revisions such that defense contractors would be
motivated to invest in new facilities, invest in new equip-
ment, and eliminate outmoded methods of production; thereby
reducing costs. This study, Profit ' 7 6
,
performed in
response to criticism that low productivity resulted from
little or no capital investment which in turn resulted from
34
low profit and high risk, looked at profitability from two
perspectives: return on sales and return on total assets
less progress payments. These rates of return for defense
contractors were compared to Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
durable goods producers. Profit ' 76 [Ref. 22] concluded
that pre-tax return on sales was higher for FTC durable
goods producers than for defense contractor profit centers
.
The five year (.1970-1974) average return on sales was 6.7
percent for FTC durable goods producers and 4 , 7 percent for
defense contractor profit centers . Profit T 76 further con-
cluded that pre-tax return on sales actually realized on
government contracts was significantly less (approximately
46 percent) than that negotiated by contracting officers.
The study group felt that this was due to cost overruns and
not to a problem which could be solved by DOD profit policy.
The pre-tax return on total assets for defense contractor
profit centers was found to be higher than that for FTC
durable goods producers. The five year (1970-1974) average
return on assets was 13.5 percent for defense contractors
and 10.7 percent for FTC durable goods producers. The study
group felt this was due to defense contractor financing
being more favorable than in the commercial sector and con-
tractor capital investment being less for defense contrac-
tors than for commercial producers. Looking at assets/sales
the study group found that the difference in investment was
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significant; the five year (1970-1974) average assets/sales
was 63 percent for FTC durable goods producers conroared to
35% for defense contractors,
K. DEFENSE PROCUREMENT CIRCULAR 7 6-3
Policy revisions recommended by the Profit '76 study
group were implemented in Defense Procurement Circular CDPC)
76-3 effective October 1, 1976. The following changes to
DOD profit policy were made
:
- imputed cost of capital for facilities investment
became an allowable cost on negotiated contracts (Cost
Accounting Standard (CAS) 414);
- level of facilities investment was assigned a weight
from 6 percent to 10 percent;
- a 30 percent adjustment factor was added to WGL to
eliminate increased profits which would possibly result
from the two changes above;
- the spread in weights for contractor risk was increased
to account for difference in risk between cost reim-
bursable and fixed-price contracts;
- productivity was added as a WGL factor; and
- record of performance and special factors were
eliminated
.
These policy revisions were designed to reward investment
of facilities capital and penalize failure to invest.
Table 1 summarizes these policy changes with those in effect
prior to DPC 76-3. [Ref. l:p. V2]
On February 17, 1977 GAO advised the Secretary of
Defense that the new profit policy provided too little
incentive to encourage increased capital investment
;
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allowing imputed interest on capital as a cost would not
reduce profit in the aggregate; the potential existed for
a profit increase through contract negotiations; and instruc-
tions governing reward for improved productivity were not
clear or comprehensive enough. [P.ef . 23] After observing
DOD's new profit policy for 18 months, GAO published its
report: "Recent Changed in the Defense Department's Profit
Policy - Intended Results Not Achieved", on March 8, 1979.
[Ref . 24] GAO found that negotiated profit rates increased
on a substantial number of DOD contracts because of the new
profit policy, specifically due to use of a factor which did
not sufficiently offset the amount of imputed interest on
capital investment allowed as a cost. GAO ' s data from 71
negotiations showed 95 percent of prenegotiation profit
objective to still be based on cost. GAO stated that. the
new profit policy lacked sufficient financial incentives and
well-defined objectives to encourage defense contractor
capital investment in cost-reducing facilities. GAO recom-
mendations for improvement included the following:
- increase emphasis on facilities capital investment;
- further reduce factors of the profit objective which
are based on estimated contract costs
;
- perform a more detailed analysis of the impact of the
new policy on profit rates;
- establish criteria and procedures for use by contract
officers in negotiations;
- develop safeguards against negotiated profits higher
than objectives; and
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- monitor policy implementation to ensure that desired
results are being achieved.
In this same timeframe the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) was reporting on its Defense Industrial Base Hearings.
The HASC, chaired by Representative Richard Ichord , reported
the following findings in a December 31, 1980 report titled,
"The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis":
- a continuing deterioration and contraction of the
defense industrial base;
- lack of a plan for defense industrial base preparedness;
- turbulence in defense system (weapons) programs;
- a shortage of critical materials and a growing depend-
ence on uncertain foreign sources for these materials;
- restrictive procurement policies and procedures;
- tax and profit policies that discourage capital
investment
;
- diffused responsibility for the condition of the indus-
trial base. [Ref. 25:p. 2-2]
These problems resulted in deterioration of the subcontrac-
tor and vendor base with a corresponding decrease in
competition
.
L. DEFENSE ACQUISITION CIRCULAR 76-23
As a result of GAO ' s recommendations and its own find-
ings, DOD again revised its profit policy by issuing DAC
76-23 which increased the weight factor for contractor
investment in facilities; created separate weight ranges
for manufacturing, research and development, and services;
and reinstated separate factors for cost and multiple
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incentives. These policy changes are summarized along with
DPC 76-3 changes and policies prior to Profit ' 7 6 in
Table 1. The Air Force Systems Command assessed the per-
formance of both DPC 76-3 and DAC 76-23 in 1982. That study
titled Profit Study '82 [Ref. 26] concluded that defense
industry capital investment increased but the increase was
still proportionately less than the commercial sector; in
spite of DPC 76-3 capital investment as a percentage of
total cost did not change during the period 1977-1981; DPC
76-3, although a generally sound concept, needs modification
and DAC 76-23, unless rescinded, will become a greater ob-
stacle to capital investment
.
M. DEFENSE FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT REVIEW
Concerned with the continual inability of the Federal
Government to control cost growth, President Reagan formally
established the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control (PPSSCC) on June 30, 1982. The executive committee
chaired by J. Peter Grace and consisting of 161 chairmen
and chief executive officers from the country's leading
corporations operated under the following charter:
- identify opportunities for increased efficiency and
reduced costs achievable by executive action or
legislation
;
- determine areas where managerial accountability can be
enhanced and administrative controls improved;




- specify areas where further study can be justified by
potential savings
;
- provide information and data relating to governmental
expenditures; indebtedness, and personnel management.
[Ref. 27]
The Grace Commission formed 22 task forces to study specific
departments and/or agencies of the executive branch of the
Federal Government and 14 task forces to study functions.
which cut across government. These task forces found that:
- DPC 76-3 and DAC 76-23 did not succeed in increasing
levels of capital investment;
- Defense contractors have reached parity with FTC
durable goods producers for return on sales
;
- Defense contractors maintain better than parity
financing as a result of government financing policies
;
- DOD contract pricing, profit, and financing policies
form an integrated system and should be reviewed as
such rather than piecemeal;
- DOD contract pricing, profit, and financing policies
should be managed through an integrated data base
management information system;
- Using a current interest rate to impute facilities
capital cost of money does not accurately reflect cost
of money for previously purchased assets. Interest
rates used for such calculations should be based on
depreciation schedules for previously purchased assets.
[Ref. l:p. V-8]
Based on these and other findings, the Grace Commission
recommended that DOD should perform a study of its overall
acquisition policy with particular attention given to con-
tract pricing, profit, and financing policies and to the
integration of these policies.
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In December 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
established the Defense Financial and Investment Review
(DFAIR) to review the interrelationship of pricing, financ-
ing, and profit policies and to make recommendations for
their integration. DFAIR compared return on assets (ROA)
for 76 defense contractors and durable goods manufacturers
(DGM) from 1970-1983. The study group found ROA for DOD
business similar to ROA for commercial business of defense
contractors and of DGM when 1980-1983 recession period is
excluded. They concluded in a June 1985 report that:
- Progress payment policy has been equitable for the
period 1970-1983;
- Profit policy does not take into account the cost of
working capital;
- Average defense contractor profitability was not
unreasonable and decreased slightly for the period
1980-1983 while durable goods manufacturers deterior-
ated dramatically;
- Profitability of defense contracts has been consistently
lower than levels negotiated by contracting officers;
- Foreign military sales (FMS) profits have been greater
than DOD work;
- Profits on DOD subcontracts were slightly less than DOD
prime contractor work;
- Cost accounting standard (CAS) 414 "Cost of Money" has
not increased profit
;
- Weighted Guidelines CWGL) need 'improvement;
- Significant capital investments have been made by
defense contractors since Profit ' 7 6 , however, the
increase was driven by factors other than DOD ' s profit
policy; and
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- Current profit policy is indifferent to productivity of
capital investment and is insufficient to bring about
productivity-enhancing improvements [Ref. l:p, E2l.
DFAIR recommended that the overall profit policy be simpli-
fied and better integrated with financing policy and length
of performance. The level of economic activity which varied
greatly during the period of the DFAIR study (1970-1983) is
of particular interest. Severe recession caused a dramatic
drop in DGM and defense contractor commercial work ROA
,
while at the same time rapidly decreasing inflation and
increased defense spending increased ROA on defense work.
This historical analysis of the DOD systems acquisition
process indicates that the same problems continually plague
the process: uncontrollable cost growth, inadequate price
compet-ition , inadequate incentives to motivate economy and
efficiency, inadequate productivity, divergent philosophies
on the part of DOD and the Business Community, and unmanage-
able technical risks associated with new systems acquisition
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III. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT
This chapter explores the environment in which govern-
ment agencies contract with corporations for necessary goods
and services. The objectives, strategies, and concerns of
both the corporation and the government are addressed.
A. CONTRACTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
A popular view" of the firm assumes the objective of the
firm to be that of maximizing profit. Another view favors
earnings per share as the primary goal of the firm. However,
maximizing total profit by diluting earnings per share can be
deceiving. That is, total profits could be increased by
issuing stock and investing the equity capital. Spreading
the earnings over a greater number of shares decreases
earnings per share. Maximizing earnings per share is an
inappropriate goal for two reasons
:
. . . it does not specify the timing or duration of
expected returns and ... it does not consider the
risk or uncertainty of the perspective earnings stream.
[Ref. 28:p. 6]
The most appropriate objective of the firm is:
. . . to maximize its value to its shareholders. [Ref. 28:
p. 6]
Justification of such an assumption lies in the fact that
maximization of the market price of the firm's common stock
is a superordinate goal. Van Home expresses this concept
well when he says
:
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The market price of a firm's stock represents the value
that market participants place on the firm . . , which,
in turn, is a reflection of the firm's investment,
financing, and dividend decisions, [Ref. 28 :p. 6]
In his book, The Management of Innovative Technological
Corporations
,
Simon Ramo characterizes two quantitative
objectives of management:
(1) Management, entrusted with the resources of the
owners, seeks to maximize the margin of return
over the cost of capital
,
(2) Management seeks to maximize the market value of
a share of common stock, iRef. 29 jp. 4]
Success, according to Ramo, is measured by how well manage-
ment makes the necessary trade-offs between these two
measurable, quantitative objectives and many nonmeasurable
,
qualitative objectives. Qualitative objectives include such
things as: maintaining technological superiority, satisfy-
ing constituents (shareholders, creditors, employees,
customers, suppliers, the government, and the public), main-
taining growth, financial stability, or achieving competitive
advantage in the world market, [Ref. 2 9
: pp , 4-27]
Operation of a corporation, especially a technological
corporation, consists of management continually engaging
in investment decisions, such as: research and development
of new products; market development to improve market share;
fixed assets to increase capacity or improve technology; or
new sources of supply. The aim of maximizing return on
capital and the margin of return over the cost of capital
is implemented by setting objectives for the return on each
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of these investments. Investment decisions are optimized
by determining an internal rate of return for each project,
assessing the associated risks for each project, and invest-
ing in those projects with the highest rate of return
commensurate with risk. Risk assessment is typically
accomplished by listing risks, assigning probabilities of
occurrence, and then evaluating a range of consequences.
In this way, the higher probability-of -success projects can
compensate for the higher risk projects and the technolog-




In trying to accomplish its goals , management compensates
sources of capital and motivates them to provide more by
optimizing its -capital structure.
.
The cost of capital is
inextricably linked to the stability of earnings . The more
unstable its earnings, the higher the interest rate the
corporation must offer its creditors . The cost of equity
capital, more difficult to quantify, depends on past per-
formance to some degree and anticipated future performance
to a larger degree. Technological corporations character-
istically experience lengthy periods of research and
development and marketing before new products generate
earnings. Consequently, purchasers of common stock of
technological corporations typically forego immediate divi-
dents for future probable payback. And the market price of
the stock is bid up or down commensurate with the expectation
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of those future returns. Debt financing, in which interest
is essentially the cost of capital, is usually cheaper than
equity financing because of the tax deductibility of
interest. However, debt financing may not be an available
option or may be inadvisable because of an excessive debt-
equity ratio. The higher the debt-equity ratio, the more
the corporation is leveraged and, consequently, the higher
the investor's risk. Quarterly and annually, sales revenue,
earnings growth, return on assets employed, and return on
equity are analyzed by constituents and serve as indicators
of management's success in optimizing its objectives.
[Ref 29:pp. 30-68]
In addition to the typical corporate strategy portrayed
above , the business community is concerned with such other
things as: U.S. and world economic trends, the regulatory
environment, politics, and societal interests. Government
contractors share these overall, business community con-
cerns while simultaneously contending with a host of
peculiar concerns. While sheltered, to some degree, from
U.S. and world economic trends, government contractors are,
to varying degrees, dependent upon the public policy pro-
cesses of the government. They are" very much susceptible
to political advocacy. The regulatory environment in which
government contractors have to operate , compared to that of
their commercial firm counterpart, is substantially greater
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in magnitude and complexity. And, as evidenced by recent
publicity, government agencies, Congress, and the public
continually scrutinize every aspect of government contrac-
tor operations.
B. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE
Monopsony, the market condition in which there is one
buyer and several producers, is the market characteristic of
government contracting. The sovereignty of the United
States Government gives it powers and immunities not present
in private contracting. In this situation government agen-
cies have significant leverage in setting terms, conditions,
prices, and profit in contracting for goods and services.
However, desiring the continued existence of many producers
to foster competition and preserve an industrial base,
government agencies try to provide adequate returns. The
federal government's policy with regard to profit, stated
in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), is that profit
should be sufficient to stimulate efficient contract per-
formance, attract the best capabilities of qualified large
and small businesses to government contracts, and maintain
a viable industrial base [Ref. 30], Government contract
prices are usually negotiated on the basis of projected
costs plus a markup. In the Department of Defense (D0n )
,
this markup is calculated using the VJeighted Guidelines
CWGL) method which assigns percentage weights to contractor
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effort, facilities investment, and contractor risk [Ref. 31].
In addition to these considerations, DO^ is faced with the
task of purchasing, on a competitive basis, a myriad of
militarily unique items. As stated in the defense Financial
and Investment Review CDFAIR) , these items are typically:
technologically complex, expensive, produced in low
volume, required to be highly reliable and maintainable,
long in development, and produced in a regulated market
environment. [Ref. l:p. III-l]
Another aspect of government contracting which makes it
unique is its socioeconomic implications: Small Business
set-asides, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
,
Aid to Labor Surplus Areas, etc. Congress, in its capaci-
ties as steward of the Treasury and delegator of contracting
authority, has administered public policy through government
contracting. Budgetary constraints preclude government
agencies from taking -advantage of exceptional values or
multi-year procurements. Although Congress removed some of
the impediments with the passage of the 1982 Department of
Defense Authorization Act, multi-year procurement is still
far from being fully implemented. Consequently, government
agencies are frequently forced to forego exceptional buying
opportunities or to use marginal contractors . Unknowns in
designing "state of the art" weapon systems frequently result
in cost overruns. And, because the Freedom of Information
Act requires the government to reveal pricing data, the
government is less effective than commercial firms in pricing
[Ref. 32]
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Recently, there has been increasing concern on the part
of Congress, the public, and government agencies about the
way the government contracts for its goods and services.
The perception has been that the government is inefficient
and ineffective in this procurement process . Cost growth
and inefficient production rates have been two of the most
persistent problems for which DOD has been seeking solutions
The early 1960 ' s were characterized by: highly centralized
control exerted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) under Secretary McMamara , overreaction to management
problems, excessively detailed procedures and regulations,
too many paper studies in lieu of physical testing, unreal-
istic management theories, and frustration on the part of
both corporate and military leaders . The result has been a
steady increase in the time required to get from full-scale
development to initial operational capability. This couDled
with unrealistic cost estimating, changes to requirements,
and inflation caused the catastrophic cost growth problems
of the 1970's.
As early as 1969, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and
his deputy, David Packard, initiated numerous actions to
solve these problems as well as to cope with impending
budget cuts. In May 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard estab-
lished the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) to advise the Secretary of Defense of the status
of each major defense system before proceeding from one
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program phase to the next in its life cycle and to conduct
management reviews to determine DOD actions required to
improve management of the defense systems acquisition
process. In May 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard issued a
memorandum delineating his improvement program. This
memorandum served as the basis for the July 1971 DOD
Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems."
The most important feature of this directive was its decen-
tralization of responsibility and authority within DOD for
the acquisition of major systems. OSD was given responsi-
bility for establishing acquisition policy and the DOD
component departments were given responsibility for identi-
fying needs and developing systems to satisfy their needs.
DOD Directive 5000.1 a-lso initiated policy and pro-
cedures to ensure efficient and effective acquisition of
major systems. One such procedure was the Development
Concept Paper (DCP), which served as a contract between OSD
and the DOD component department to determine joint responsi'
bilities for monitoring program progress. The DCP also
provided the basic documentation for use by the DSARC in
making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
In October 1973, the Joint Logistics Commanders issued
the Joint Design-to-Cost Guide in response to the need for
cost control. In May 1975, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
William Clements issued DOD Directive 5000.28, "Design-to-
Cost", formalizing the objectives of design-to-cost:
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(1) to establish cost as a parameter equal in importance
to technical requirements and schedules throughout
design, development, production, and operation and
(2) to identify and establish cost elements as management
goals for program managers and contractors to achieve
the best balance between life-cycle cost, acceptable
performance, and schedule. [Ref. 33 :p. 77]
In April 1976, the Director, Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) issued 0MB Circular A-109, "Major Systems
Acquisition", which defined major systems acquisition pro-
grams for all government agencies. [Ref. 33:pp. 7^-82]
In 1981 Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci
chartered five working groups to review the weaoon systems
acquisition process and to recommend changes for economy
and efficiency. The working groups submitted a combined
report on March 31, 1981. On April 30, 1981, after exten-
sive review of the report and input from the service
secretaries, Secretary Carlucci issued the "Carlucci
Initiatives" which have become known as the Department of
Defense (DOD) Acquisition Improvement Program. The Acqui-
sition Improvement Program emphasized improved long-range
planning, shorter acquisition schedules, more realistic
budgets, reduced cost, and enhanced stability. Without
enumerating all 32 initiatives, the most important ones
were :
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and
the Associate Director of the Office of Management and
Budget were added to the membership of the Defense
Resources Board (DRB) to assist the Secretary of Defense
align weapon systems acquisition with the planning,
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programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). The role
of the DRB was narrowed to consideration of only major
issues. Lesser issues were left for Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service staffs to decide.
The service secretaries were added to the membershiD
of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC), the DOD executive committee which reviews major
programs at milestones for approval to proceed to the
next phase.
One of the initiatives required the services to document
for DSARC that resources exist in the five-year defense
program (FYDP) before being allowed to proceed.
OSD and service secretaries were required to delegate
more authority and accountability to program managers
.
Cost thresholds for determining whether a system would
be defined as major or not were increased from $100
million to $200 million (FY 80 dollars) in Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTSE) funds and
from $500 million to $1 billion (FY 80 dollars) in
procurement funds. Raising these thresholds served
to decentralize control thereby providing economy and
efficiency
.
Four major changes were implemented with regard to the
weapon systems acquisition process. Summarized in
Figure 1, they were:
1. The Mission Element Meed Statement (MENS), which
documented mission need determination, was
replaced with the Justification for Major System
New Start (JMSNS), a document normally submitted
to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as part of
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). This
served to better integrate the acquisition
process with PPBS.
2. The first SECDEF decision point was changed from
milestone 0, program initiation, to milestone I,
requirement validation. The system concept paper
(SCP) replaced the decision coordinating paper
(DCP) , integrated program summary (IPS), and
milestone reference file (MRF) at milestone I
as required DSARC documentation. This served
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3. The second SECDEF decision point was changed
from milestone I, alternative selection, to
milestone II, program go-ahead.
4. The decision of whether or not to go into pro-
duction, milestone III, was delegated to the
services. [Ref. 34:p. 91]
These changes reduced, from three to two, the number of
formal OSD milestone reviews and reduced, from four to two,
the number of SECDEF decisions required. This dencentral-
ization and program management emphasis provided by the DOD
Acquisition Improvement Program greatly enhanced the economy
and efficiency of the weapon systems acquisition process
.
It also served to reduce the risks faced by both the govern-
ment and contractors with regard to such things as cost,





IV. THE MATURE OF RISK
This chapter explores the concept of risk. Risks faced
by corporations in contracting with the government are
examined first. Then, risks which the government bears are
looked at. The processes of risk identification, risk




Malcolm Salter categorizes the job of a corporate gen-
eral manager into five basic dimensions: supervising
current operation, planning for future operation, designing
and administering decision-making structures, developing
human resources and capabilities , and representing and
holding an organization responsible to its various con-
stituencies [Ref. 35:pp. 6-7]. He emphasizes:
Planning for future operations involves making informed
judgements about what opportunities and risks will face
the company in the future and identifying alternate
means of either exploiting these opportunities or
accommodating these risks. [Ref. 35 :p, 6]
For government contractors , the uncertainties experienced
by all firms, such as: demand for products and services,
availability of resources, competition, and economic con-
ditions, are increased. This is because the government is:
. . . the largest single force in advanced technological
development as well as in basic research. [Ref. 29 :p. 316]
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The Aerospace Industries Association's Risk Elements in
Government Contracting
,
a study which examined key areas of
risk in government contracting, identified the. following
significant risks:
(1) The government, in determining the appropriate type
of contract to be used for a given procurement, asks
contractors to take risks of a greater magnitude.
(2) Government warranty clauses in contracts for products
and services, which are insufficiently defined,
proven, or tested, have resulted in a shift of risk
to contractors
.
(3) Lack of indemnification for ultra hazardous work
poses one of the greatest risks government con-
tractors face .
( M- ) Government agency procurement policies and practices
.
have increased the types and amounts of ordinary and
necessary costs of doing business excluded from
pricing negotiations-, thereby increasing contractor's
risk of realizing a reasonable return on investment.
(5) Tendencies on the part of the government and con-
tractors to overoptimistically define and price the
effort required to solve technological problems
,
underrate unknowns, and rationalize abilities to
manage potential future problems contribute to cost
growth and contractor's risk of return.
(6) Contractors face profit and cost risks in the event
of contract termination for the convenience of the
government
.
(7) Contract revisions due to the government's failure
to carefully and realistically assess future alloca-
tion of resources results in risk of repeated and
costly rearrangement, loss of performance efficiency
and reduction in profits.
(8) Beset by funding reduction, contractors assume the
risk of not recovering unfunded cost, earnings and
termination expenses
.
(9) Administrative expense and effort involved in
attempting to satisfy what the government might
retroactively determine was its requirement for
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cost or pricing data coupled with the possibility
of a contract price reduction comprise a formidable
risk.
(10) Prime contractors, required by the government to
certify cost and pricing data of their subcontrac-
tors
,
risk reduced prime contract prices for
defective subcontractor data.
(11) Government contracting officers possess unilateral
rights of change, termination, and stop work; which,
if exercised by a party to a commercial contract,
would constitute breach of contract. The corre-
sponding remedy procedures cause uncertainty when
controversy occurs. Contractors face risk of
selection of wrong forum for dispute, delay, and
unrecoverable expenses.
(12) Government policy, directed toward elimination of
government facilities ownership, is shifting
facilities investment risk to contractors.
(13) There is a risk of the government acquiring rights
to precontract inventions in addition to those
conceived or first actually reduced to practice in
the performance of research and development under
government contract.
(14) Contractors face the risk of proprietary data being
misused or -disclosed by the government.
(15) Government requirements, that contractors furnish
data capable of use by others to fabricate identical
articles depicted in such data, increase contrac-
tors' risk of meeting contractual commitments.
(16) Contractors risk being arbitrarily and unjustly
penalized in the source selection process because
management systems such as Cost/Schedule Control
Systems Criteria are complex, voluminous, and
costly
.
(17) Legislative requirements, regulations, and adminis-
trative controls requiring complete documentation
on the part of government contractors increase
risks by increasing cost, lessening competition,
and increasing changes of default termination and
exclusion from future contract awards. [Ref. 13: pp.
6-46]
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It should be noted that these concerns
,
published by the
Aerospace Industries Association, are those of corporations
engaged in government contract work. This list reflects
their own, potentially biased view. Specifically, govern-
ment contractors are becoming increasingly concerned about
the perception that risk is being shifted from the govern-
ment to the contractor. This concern is valid to the extent
that government procurement regulations, policies and prac-
tices have, as an objective, shifted risk. However, this
says nothing of the appropriateness or fairness of the
sharing arrangement. Such a determination is difficult
because each contract is handled on an individual basis.
The risk-sharing arrangement depends on such things as type
of contract, negotiating abilities of both sides, nature of
goods and services being contracted for, as well as many
other factors. Consequently, even if such arrangements
were quantifiable, problems of comparability would remain.
It is also easy to see, looking at this list, why
there is such difficulty quantifying government contractor
risk, modifying profit measures to reflect that risk, and
being able to compare government contractor risk with that
of commercial firms.
B. GOVERNMENT RISK
Risks experienced by the government in contracting are
the same as those experienced by contractors . The degree
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to which either party experiences particular risk elements
depends on the type of contract which in turn depends on
the phase of the acquisition process.
DOD policy dictates that an appropriate contract type
be employed commensurate with the circumstances involved in
a specific acquisition. The type of contract determines the
apportionment of responsibility to both parties and thereby
determines the degree of risk each party is to bear. If
the contract type selection distributes risk fairly, effi-
ciency and economy will more than likely be achieved. If
the apportionment of risk is unfair, then the program will
more than likely be disrupted and result in inefficiency
and cost overruns. The major motivation for ensuring
equitable apportionment of risk is the fact that selection
of an inappropriate type of contract invariably results in
the program becoming unaf fordable , the contract becomes
unenforceable, and both parties suffer. Gordon describes
this concept best when he says
:
The acquisition of a major weapon system is a mutual
undertaking. Both parties commit to mutually reciprocal
obligations by way of conduct, financial contribution,
and effort. Often these obligations transcend the
ability of either party to fully accommodate the conse-
quences of default. For large system acquisitions, the
financial risk assumed by the contractor in the event
of default almost always exceeds corporate capacity
to continue as a viable business entity. Conversely,
the government has invested costs, time, effort, lost
alternative opportunities, and military commitments.
We cannot actually tolerate the financial collapse of
a major weapon system developer midway in a program for
a variety of political, economic, and military reasons.
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Consequently, realistic assessment forces us to conclude
that the parties do not expect to enforce the contract
literally, despite the hard bargaining exerted to
negotiate the express contract and the great importance
assigned to our contractual rights and remedies
,
[Ref. 36:p. 41]
There are two basic types of contracts, fixed price and
cost reimbursable. A fixed price contract requires the
contractor to produce the goods or perform the services
specified for a fixed price. The various forms of fixed
price contracts
,
predicated on the method with which the
fee is determined, include: firm fixed price (FFP), fixed
price with economic adjustment (FPEA), fixed price redeter-
mination (FPR), fixed price incentive fee (FPIF), and fixed
price incentive-successive targets (FPIS). With the cost
reimbursable contract, the contractor is required to provide
his best effort performance in return for material and labor
costs, allowable overhead, and a profit calculated using
the weighted guidelines . The various forms of cost reim-
bursable contracts include: cost, cost plus fixed fee
CCPFF) , cost plus incentive fee (CPIF), and cost plus award
fee (CPAF). Figure 2 shows the degree of risk apportioned
as a function of contract type. Fixed price contracts have
the potential for apportioning unreasonable risk to contrac-
tors, while cost reimbursable contracts have the potential
for contractor abuse.
Conventional theory suggests that each phase of the
acquisition process has a corresponding contract type which
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apportions risk appropriately. The fixed price type
contract is appropriate for use during the concept explora-
tion phase because it provides a means of putting contrac-
tors in a truly competitive position. Typically, what is
sought by the government in the concept exploration phase
is a response to a Request for Proposal (RFP) which defines
a mission need. Therefore, what is being contracted for
is a proposal for a system to meet a mission need. Compe-
tition, a primary goal during this phase, could be achieved
through a number of parallel short-term fixed price contracts
While the potential uncertainties are greater in the demon-
stration and validation (DSV) phase thereby warranting a
cost reimbursement type contract, the desire for continued
competition in this phase indicates that contracts should
continue to be fixed price in the D£V phase. The full
scale development (FSD) phase may require a cost reimburse-
ment type contract because the costs associated with the
technical uncertainties in this phase cannot be estimated
with any degree of accuracy. This phase calls for the
highest degree of flexibility in order to optimize required
tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and performance. The
CPAF contract in which the fee is determined by evaluation
of the product and the contractor at predetermined intervals
or at contract completion; the CPIF contract in which the
fee is determined according to a formula; or the CPFF
contract in which the total cost is known are appropriate
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for the FSD phase. If pilot production is conducted, a
fixed price contract for that subphase would be more appro^-
priate. An FPIF contract would be appropriate for produc-
tion. Contract type decisions are typically predicated on
the maturity of the design and on the judgement of the
project manager as to whether design changes will be few or
numerous. The government typically favors fixed price
contracts because they are easier to administer and they
place a higher degree of risk on the contractor. The
greatest risk which the government faces is the technical
risk involved in designing and eventually producing "state-
of-the-art" weapon systems. And, as does the contractor,
the government faces risks associated with cost, schedule,
and performance.
Many factions within the government have divergent
priorities with regard to a major system acquisition. The
user wants a superior product delivered as soon as possible
and is not usually concerned with cost. Technical people
are concerned with enhancing the "state-of-the-art" to the
exclusion of cost or schedule. Financial managers are
interested in cost control. If any one of these areas are
of greater concern than any others to program managers
,
more
restrictive or more explicitly detailed contracts are
negotiated with contractors . This serves to shift the risk
from the government to the contractor. In order to achieve
the lowest possible cost, timely delivery, and maximum
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technical performance in a major system acquisition, the
government must optimize these parameters simultaneously
within budget, schedule and specification constraints.
Striving for the lowest possible cost, timely delivery, and
maximum technical performance, DOD invariably structures
contracts inversely proportional to its confidence in attain-
ing these goals. This view is expressed by Gordon:
The less we expect to be able to gauge and hold down
costs, for example, the more rigid we are inclined to
structure the pricing matrix of the contract. Although
logic would dictate the converse, we instinctively
endeavor to make the contract restrictive or most
explicit in those areas of greatest risk and/or uncer-
tainty. It is as if we seek to incorporate into the
contract that confidence that is fundamentally lacking
in the program. LRef. 36 :p. 30]
Cost, normally predictable because of past performance
with similar products, becomes a critical risk factor when
estimating it on a first time basis in connection with new,
high technology products . Previous DOD experience with
cost growth serves as evidence of this. Bennett has
observed four main reasons for cost growth:
1. Economic inflation, which has affected system costs,
is beyond DOD control
.
2. Changes in the enemy threat and advancements in
military technology cannot be ignored during the
systems acquisition life cycle.
3. Using current forecasting methodology and cost-
estimating techniques, the cost of new systems can
be estimated with no better than 30 percent accuracy.
4. Unknown technical risks plague new major systems
throughout most of their development and production
cycles. [Ref. 38]
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The POD Manufacturing Management Handbook
,
after surveying
30 major programs over an extended period of time , found
the reasons for cost growth associated with new programs
to be those depicted in Figure 3.
Source: [Ref. 25:p. 6-25]
Figure 3. Sources of Cost Growth
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Decisions made early in a program determine costs
throughout the life of a weapon system. Therefore, from
program initiation, life-cycle cost (LCC), the total cost
including development, procurement, operation, support, and
retirement, is considered together with performance and
schedule constraints. As demonstrated in Figure 4, decis-
ions made during the concept exploration phase fix approx-
imately 70 percent of the LCC. Eighty-five percent of the
LCC is frozen when only an approximate four percent of
expenditures have been made [Ref. 37 :p. 1-8], Because of
this effect, concept selection and tradeoffs between cost
estimates, performance levels, and schedules become essen-



























System Life Cycle, DSARC Milestones
Source: [Ref. 37:p. 1-8]
Figure 4. Weapon System Life-Cycle Cost
(LCC)
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Schedule, normally stable, predictable, and controllable
for redundant manufacturing processes, also becomes a major
risk factor when initially establishing it for new system
development or modifying it as in the case of contractual
changes. Production schedules are susceptible to: design
stability, funding, specifications, lead time requirements,
learning curve, quantity required, system complexity, and
whether new system start or off-the-shelf item. Because
scheduling involves phasing many elements such as: engi-
neering, production design, parts and material procurement,
identification and integration of workers, machine and
facility set up, fabrication, assembly, installation, test,
quality assurance, and delivery; complete analysis of the
manufacturing operation is required. The least little
destabilizing influence increases the risk- of schedule
delays
.
Performance, like schedule, is usually set by the pro-
gram manager. And just like schedule, the performance
parameter can be a causative factor in the risk assessment
process by virtue of exotic specifications, system sophisti-
cation, hazardous components, and/or dealing with a new
system start.
Historically, performance was defined by specifications
and schedule was established early in the acquisition
process. Cost was utilized as a means of assuring that
performance specifications were achieved within contractual
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time constraints. This scenario invariably resulted in
funding problems and cost overruns, DOD , realizing that
there is always a high degree of uncertainty with regard to
cost early in the acquisition process for major system new
starts demonstrated in Figure 5, changed its policy. That
is, cost, performance, and schedule are now considered to
be on equal footing and all are considered flexible. Accord-
ing to the DOD Manufacturing Management Handbook :
Until new systems are adequately defined and the associ-
ated system parameters developed with any degree of
confidence, resource and performance projections should
be confined to those program objectives associated with






10 TO 20 YEARS
Source: LRef. 25:p. 6-26]
Figure 5. Flow of Expenditures in a Typical Weapons
System Program
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Analysis of government risk indicates that new develop-
ment is the least attractive alternative available to those
concerned with weapon systems acquisition because of the
intrinsic cost, schedule, and performance uncertainties.
However, since development and maintenance of a superior
technological advantage in weapon systems design is one of
our highest national strategic goals , risk-avoidance is not
a viable option. Program stability, one of the largest
factors involved in risk reduction, is, therefore, very
important to government risk aversion. Changes in critical
system or acquisition process parameters, such as, cost,
performance or schedule ripple throughout the program '*
causing disruption, reducing the accuracy of estimates and
assumptions, and increasing risk. Major changes can result
in devastating results downstream. Operational readiness,
logistics support, and life-cycle affordability typically
suffer for poor decisions early in a program.
C. RISK ANALYSIS
One conclusion, which repeatedly comes out of the
plethora of profitability and risk analyses, is that there
is no universally accepted method for analyzing data to
assess government contractor risks. A prerequisite to
developing such a method would be a formal analysis of the
concept of risk.
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In attempting to define risk, there is some disagree-
ment between the experts. Knight refers to risk, simplist-
ically, as "measurable uncertainty." [Ref. 39] However,
the concept of risk is a complex one. Levy and Sarnat sum
up the "essence of risk" most appropriately. They agree
that expectations of possible future gains, based on his-
torical data and forecasts of future events , are rarelv
precise. Consequently, the best that can be expected is:
an estimate of a range of possible future costs and
benefits and the relative chances of earning a high
or low profit on investment. LRef. 40]
Levy and Sarnat distinguish between two states of expecta-
tion: certainty and risk (uncertainty). Most definitions
of risk include the concept of uncertainty. Rowe charac-
terizes uncertainty as
:
the absence of information about past, present, or future
events, values or conditions. LRef. 41:p. 17]
And he characterizes risk as
:
potential for realization of unwanted, negative conse-
quences for an event. [Ref. 41:p. 24]
Uncertainty, "the absence of information", exists in
varying degrees. Therefore, risk analyses must take into
consideration the proportion of information which is not
known or the "degree of uncertainty." Identifying two types
of information, Rowe has categorized two types of
uncertainty
:
(1) Descriptive Uncertainty - absence of information
relating to the Identity of the variables that
explicitly define a system.
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(2) Measurable Uncertainty - absence of information
relating to the soecification of value assigned
to each variable in a system. [Ref . 41:p. 17]
He has also identified three processes common to all
systems: human behavior, natural events, and random
events. And he asserts that uncertainty can be reduced
for both types of uncertainty and all processes with one
exception, random measurement uncertainty for future events.
He cautions that reduction of uncertainty does not reduce
risk. Information gained from reducing uncertainty can-
be used to control risk, an action which Rowe refers to as
"risk aversion."
In trying to construct an anatomy of risk, Rowe,
referring to the work of Otway [Ref. 42 J and Kates [Ref. 43],
utilizes a classification system for risk assessment con-
sisting of three elements
:
(1) Risk Identification - qualitative enumeration of
all possible risks, involves reduction of descrip-
tive uncertainty.
(2) Risk Estimation - identification of consequences
of decisions and estimation of magnitude of risks,
involves reduction of measurement uncertainty.
(3) Risk Evaluation - anticipation of the acceptability
of risk, involves risk aversion and/or risk
acceptance. L'Ref. 41:p. 25J
He further divides risk estimation into a five-step
process
:
(1) Causative Events - probability of event occurrence
^e
(2) Outcomes - probability of resultants (p )
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(3) Exposure - probability of pathway and exposure (p )
x
(4) Consequences - probability of consequence occurrence
(p ) . The probability of each consequence p is a






e , p , pk )
(5) Consequence Values - range of consequences evaluated
by risk agents. Consequence values are a function
of consequence definition and probability of conse-
quence occurrence as determined by each risk agent
:
C , (v) = f , (p , , C ) , where C , (v) = conseauenceck ck r ck' c ' ck
value determined by risk agent k, and p , = proba-
bility of each consequence determined by risk agent
k. L'Ref. 41 :p. 28 j
He concludes that risk estimation (R) is a function of the
probability of consequence occurrence and the consequence's
value to the risk taker:
R = f (d , C(v))
- c
More specifically, he computes the expected value of risk
(EVR) for an undertaking with n consequences as follows:
EVR = Zd v
* n n
where p = the Drobabilitv of occurrence
^n * J
v = the value of consequences
n ^
Rowe assumes independence of p and v which suggests
limited application. Stated another way:
the combination of probability and consequence defines
risk. [Ref. 41:p. 39]
Because valuation of consequences by different risk
agents involves subjective value judgements, risk estimation
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is subjective. However, as Rowe points out, experimenta-
tion and empirical observation more closely approximate
objective risk estimation. Therefore, risk estimation
involving a large number of repeated observations should
provide a more objective analysis than modeling.
Risk evaluation, involving risk acceptance and/or risk
aversion, comprises the second half of the total risk
assessment process. ' Risk acceptance decisions are subjec-
tive. If the risk under consideration is below an arbi-
trarily determined level, it is considered acceptable. If
a risk Is unacceptable then risk aversion, the action taken
to reduce risk, could take the form of risk avoidance,
reduced exposure to risk, or control of causative events.
[Ref. 41:p. 44]
Therefore, the anatomy of risk, as developed by Rowe,

















Source: [Ref. 41:p. 45]
Figure 6 . Anatomy of Risk
73
Methods of risk estimation and risk evaluation are many
and varied. However, for technological corporations, there
are two main categories of risk to consider: business risk
and financial risk. Finnerty categorizes as business risks
all risks which affect all businesses: technical risks,
bidding risks, production risks, cost risks, government
action risks, and commercial market risks, He categorizes
as financial risk: 'the risk of bankruptcy and the risk of
return. He contends that both financial risk and business
risk reflect the impact of a company's operating decisions.
However, only financial risk reflects the impact of a
company's financial decisions. Consequently, he concludes,
financial risk, measured as the coefficient of variation
of net income, is an "all-inclusive reflection of a company's
overall uncertainty. [Ref . 4-4]
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V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the empirical analysis and the
implications of the findings. Four methods are investi-
gated: mean-variance analysis of returns on net worth;
capital asset pricing model; mean-variance analysis of back-
log; and mean variance analysis of five-year defense program
elements
.
A. MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS OF RATE OF RETURN
1 . Methodology
Expanding the analysis performed in the thesis
titled "DOD Contractor Profitability 1980-1984" [Ref. 45],
this study seeks to analyze defense industry risk versus
that experienced by the commercial sector and the relation-
ship between risk and return. Financial performance data
was collected from SEC 10K Reports and applied to Morse and
Kramer's sample of 49 companies. The resulting sample data
were used to analyze contractor risk utilizing mean-variance
analysis of return on net worth.
Morse and Kramer derived their sample of 49 compan-
ies, representing a broad cross-section and including
principal industry groupings, by identifying which companies
appeared in the DOD publication, 100 Companies Receiving the
Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards [Ref. 46], in
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each of the five years, 1980-1984. They disregarded the
relative position of each company in the reports as well as
the proportion of DOD sales to total sales in sample selec-
tion. However, they did use the proportion of DOD sales
to total sales to segregate two additional comparative sub-
samples: 36 commercially-oriented firms and 13 DOD-oriented
firms. Thirty percent DOD sales was chosen as the division
criterion because a clear break in the distribution of
percent DOD sales over time occurred at that point. ^he
36 commercially-oriented firms had less than 30 percent DOD
sales and the 13 DOD-oriented firms had greater than 30
percent DOD sales. Tables (2), (3), and (4) list these
samples of 49, 36, and 13, respectively.
After sample selection, it was necessary to consider
an appropriate profit measure. Accountants and economists
hold widely differing views of the meaning of profit.
Profit, as interpreted by an accountant, is simply the
difference between revenues and costs, synonymous with net
income [Fef. 47]. Economists, on the other hand, define
profit more narrowly. They are concerned with opportunity
costs, the value that could be produced if the required
resources were used to produce other outputs. Consequently,
economic profit is what remains after all explicit and
implicit costs for wages, rent, and interest are paid [Ref.
48]. Because accounting profit includes economic profit
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synonymous with net income, is usually expressed as a oer-
centage of a selected base: sales, assets, or caoital.
Return on sales does not measure the resources which
generate profit. Return on assets does not measure whether
owners receive returns commensurate with risk. Return on
net worth reflects stockholders equity; consequently, it
was considered the most appropriate measure . Therefore
,
profit was measured utilizing the rate of return on net
worth, synonymous with rate of return on common shareholders'
equity (ROE) calculated as follows:
RnF _ __^ Net income after taxes
capital stock + surplus + retained earnings
The relationship between risk and return is a
complex one, as evidenced by the paucity of empirical
analyses in this area. Fisher and Hall offer two possible
reasons for this paucity:
. . . there are two reasons for this neglect . One relates
to policy-uses of such investigation, the other to the
required theoretical assumptions. [Ref. 9:p. 26]
They go on to explain that in the unregulated sector of the
economy, profit policy is focused on preserving competition
to ensure that profits are appropriate. And, in the regu-
lated sector, they contend that profits are set as an
ex ante component of price, which is negotiated rather than
set competitively. Therefore, they conclude, regulators
and regulated firms are more interested in analyses of the
comparability of government contract profits with those of
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commercial firms and industries. The second reason given by
Fisher and Hall, the required theoretical assumptions, is
explained as follows:
The difficulty is that it is impossible to observe
anticipations. . . . the assumption required to handle
anticipation may well have discouraged empirical
investigation. [Ref. 9:p. 26]
They suggest that this problem can be overcome by using a
proxy for the expected rate of return. Fisher and Hall
chose a definition of risk that is based on the deviation
of company rates of return from their own mean:
For a firm already in some line of commerce, intraindustry
dispersion is not a good measure of risk. If the industry
group has diverse but temporally stable rates of return,
the firm's own history will provide a better basis for
measuring its risk exposure. If the rates of the group
members are similar, presumably the firm will be con-
cerned not with how well it is going to do relative to
its rival, but with how stable its future profits will
be. LRef. 9:p. 32]
















standard deviation of rates of return about the
average for firm i;
rate of return in period t for firm i;
average rate of return over the period for firm i;
number of years included in the period.
Utilizing Fisher and Hall's measure of risk, this
study investigated the statistical correlation between each
firm's risk exposure and average rate of return for the 49
firms in Morse and Kramer's sample for the period 197 6 to
1984. Sample data is contained in Table 6 of Appendix A.
A firm's average rate of return can be expressed as the sum
of an average risk-adjusted rate of return, r
,
and a risk
premium which compensates the firm for greater earnings
variability, i.e.", risk exposure, ba . :
r
.
= r + ba
.
1 o 1
where r. = average rate of return for firm i;
r = average risk-adjusted rate of return for ail
firms;
a . = standard deviation of rates of return about the
average for firm i;
b = marginal rate of profit per increment of dis-
persion (slope of regression line)
2 . Analysis
Figure 7, a scatter diagram of the 49 firms plotted
mean versus standard deviation, graphically shows the rela-
tionship between mean return on net worth and the dispersion
of those returns
.
a. Sample of 49 Contractors
Sample data for the 49 firms was regressed as
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worth versus standard deviation of rate of return on net
worth 1976-1984 for 49 firms, yields a close approximation
to a straight line. This would indicate that the data can
be approximated by an equation of the form:
r . = r + ba .
1 o 1
Using the observed data contained in Appendix A of this
study to estimate the parameters r and b of the regression
line resulted in the following values for the sample of 49
firms
:
r. = 0.149 + 0.017a., R 2 = 0.017
i l
'
(0.289) std error of b
2
The value of R for the sample of 49 firms is extremely low
which would indicate that there is no linear correlation
between average rate of return and the standard deviation
for the sample of 49 firms.
Of the tests of hypotheses concerning regression
coefficients r and b, those concerning the coefficient b
o to
are important because b is the slope of the regression line.
The coefficient b is also the change in the mean of the
rates of return on net worth corresponding to a unit change
in standard deviation of rate of return on net worth. If
b = 0, the regression line would be horizontal and would
indicate that the mean of the rates of return on net worth
does not depend linearly on standard deviation. Therefore,
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testing the null hypothesis b = against the alternative
hypothesis b i 0, where b is the parameter to be estimated
at the 0.05 level of significance yielded the following:
Mull Hypothesis: b =
Alternative Hypothesis: b i
Level of Significance: a = 0.05
Criterion: Reject the null hypothesis
if -t /0 > t > t /0
a/ I a/
I
with n-2 degrees of freedom
t =






























For the sample of 49 firms the computed t is
t =




and the critical t is:
t
o. 02s = 1 - 9B
Since t - 0.115 j£ t
25
= 1.96
and t = 0.115 £ -t Q25 = -1.96,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude
tnat the coefficient b is not significantly different from
zero at the 0.05 level for the sample of 49 firms. We also
conclude that there does not appear to be a linear relation-
ship between the average rate of return for the sample of
49 firms and the standard deviation of the rates of return
about the mean.
b. Sample of 36 Commercially-Oriented Firms
Similarly, sample data for the 36 commercially-
oriented firms, also contained in Appendix A of this study,
were regressed resulting in the following values
:
r. = 0.137 + 0.057a-, R 2 = 0.034
l l
(0.343) std error of b
2
The value of R for the sample of 36 firms is also extremely
low, indicating no linear correlation.
For the sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms
the computed t is
:
t = 0.325
and the critical t is:
V025 = 1 - 9S
86
Since t = 0.325 i t Q25 = 1.96
and t = 0.325 i -t
Q Q25 = -1.96,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we con-
clude for the sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms that
the coefficient b is not statistically significant at the
0.05 level. There appears to be no linear relationship
between the average rate of return and standard deviation
for the sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms as well,
c. Sample of 13 DOD-Oriented Firms
Sample data for the 13 DOD-oriented firms,
exhibited in Appendix A, were regressed resulting in the
following values:
r. = 0.137 + 0.333a-, R 2 = 0.563l i '
(0.290) std error of b
The value of R for the sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms is
of such a size as to be considered useful for group type
predictions. This indicates that there is a positive
linear correlation between the variables regressed.
For the sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms the
computed t is:
t = 2.53
and the critical t is:
V 025 = 2 - 20
Since t = 2.53 > t Q25 = 2.20
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we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude
for the sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms that the coefficient
b is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. We also
conclude that a linear relationship exists between the
average rate of return and standard deviation for the sample
of 13 DOD-oriented firms.
3 . Results
Statistical findings are summarized as follows:
Sample of 49 firms:
r. = 0.149 + 0.017a., R 2 = 0.017
l l
'
(0.289) std error of b
Sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms:
r. = 0.137 + 0.057a-, R 2 = 0.034
l i
(0.343) std error of b
Sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms:
r. = 0.137 + 0.333a., R 2 = 0.563
i i
(0.290) std error of b
The resulting low values of R , high standard
errors of the coefficient b, and finding that the coefficient
b is not statistically significant, for the sample of 49
firms and the sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms,
were contrary to a priori expectations. However, the signs
of the coefficients for all three samples were as expected,
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2
that Is, positive. The value of R for the sample of 13
DOD-oriented firms was sizeable enough to be considered use-
ful. Although the coefficient b was found to be statistic-
ally significant for the sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms, its
standard error was found to be sizeable.
Because the b coefficients for the sample of 4 9 firms
and the sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms were not
statistically significant, no inferences can be made regard-
ing comparability of risk premiums, ba .
.
The statistical significance of the coefficient b
for the 13 DOD-oriented firms supports the a priori expecta-
tion that a, the standard deviation of rates of return, is
an appropriate measure of total risk. The finding that the
coefficients for the 49 firms and the 36 commercially-
oriented firms were not statistically significant weakens
the inference but by no means disproves the hypothesis.
The positive sign of the coefficient b obtained for
all three samples supports the theory that firms require
larger expected rates of return given increased uncertainty
of potential earnings.
2The value of R for the 13 DOD-oriented firms was
sizeable enough to indicate that there is a linear relation-
ship between the average rate of return and the measure of
2
risk, a. However, the low value of R for the 49 firms
and the 36 commercially-oriented firms suggests that there
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are factors other than risk which account for the observed
differences in rates of return.
In their December 1967 study, Risk and the Aerospace
Rate of Return, Fisher and Hall investigated some of the
factors which they believed accounted for the difference in
rates of return. They state:
Dispersion is only one characteristic of the probability
distribution of earnings; skewness is another that may
help explain the observed differences. [Ref. 9:p. 39 J
They tested their hypothesis that risk premiums may be lower
for firms with skewed earnings distributions by including
a measure of skewness into their model. Figure 8 depicts
the difference between symmetric and skewed distribution.
2
The addition, of a skewness measure increased R only slightly
and resulted in a coefficient of skewness that was not
statistically significant. Those results would suggest that
skewness did not account for any portion of the differences
in rates of return. However, they also found that skewness
became significant after adjustments were made for trend,
autocorrelation, and industry membership.
Fisher and Hall further suggested:
In part this low correlation between rate of return and
risk may be due to the influence of broad industry effects
.
Differences among industries in market structure , tech-
nology, average managerial ability, capital structure,
and similar factors could produce industry differentials
.
[Ref. 9:p. 39]
To adjust their model for industry membership they intro-










































































the equation to relate each company's rate of return to its
risk exposure. The effect of a dummy variable is to shift
the vertical axis intercept of the regression line upward or
downward. Using the dummy variable method does not permit a
different risk coefficient, b, for each industry. However,
it does provide an average risk-adjusted rate of return for
each industry. Fisher and Hall's adjustment to their model
for industry membership resulted in a substantially increased
2
value of R .
Fisher and Hall also identified that some of what was
appearing as earnings variability was actually the result of
time trend. They contend that measurement of deviation about
the mean results in a larger deviation than if the measurement
were deviation about the trend. This can be seen in Figure 9.
To remove this effect, they developed an alternative measure
of risk, a- , and substituted it into their model. For most
industries the risk-adjusted rates of return changed little
after eliminating the trend effect. However, the aerospace
industry, the major supplier of DOD goods and services, was
one industry, which did show significantly larger average
risk-adjusted rates of return after eliminating the trend.
Another effect which Fisher and Hall investigated
was that of autocorrelation, the correlation* of a variable
with itself over time. This effect is displayed in Figure
10. They corrected for this effect by: testing for auto-

















































































Source: [Ref. 9:p. 44]
Figure 10. Autocorrelated Earnings
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those firms that exhibited positive serial correlation for
rate of return; and removing autocorrelated firms from the
sample. The result of removing autocorrelated firms was
increased risk-adjusted rates of return for those industries.
The final form of the Fisher and Hall model is as
follows
:




+ b sir. + c
.
where, r. . = average rate of return for firm i in
industry j ,
a . . = standard deviation of rates of return about
the trend for firm i in industry j
,
s.. = measure of skewness of rates of return about
i]
the trend for firms in industry j
,
c . = dummy variable for industry j , the risk
adjusted rate of return for industry j
.
The Fisher and Hall study demonstrated that risk signifi-
cantly affects average industry rates of return provided
adjustments were made to the model. Their study also suggests
that the model is somewhat flexible with regard to which vari-
ables or adjustments are included. It also suggests that
similar adjustments for skewness, industry membership, trend
effects, and autocorrelation to the model used in this thesis
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would result in statistically significant regression coeffi-
cients and increased correlation coefficients.
Gloria Hurdle, in her November 1974 study, "Leverage,
Risk, Market Structure and Profitability", developed a three-
simultaneous-equation multiple regression model to analyze
the relationships among leverage, market structure, risk and
profitability. The three equations and the variables she




a = CONSTANT - M - ADV - ASSET - GROUP + K/Y
+ DEBT + DV
Debt Equation
DEBT = CONSTANT + M + GROW + GROUP + tt - a
+ ASSETS + K/Y
Profit Equation
tt = CONSTANT + M + ADV + ASSET + GROUP + DEBT + a
where, tt = rate of return on stockholders' equity;
a = deviation in annual profits, defined as
n
E | TT ("t ) - TT(t-l) | /(n-1) .
t=l
DEBT = leverage, defined as debt divided by the sum
of debt and equity.
M = market share, estimated.
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GROW = growth of sales.
GROUP = concentration, estimated, minus market share.
ADV = advertising as a percent of sales.
K/Y = capital (total assets) divided by sales.
ASSET = logarithm of average assets, used as a measure
of firm size.
DV = demand variance.
Hurdle's model further demonstrates additional factors which
may be added to our simple model to account for differences
in rates of return. She adjusts for market share, advertis-
ing intensity, firm size, firm concentration, and leverage
in her profit equation. Addition of the sales growth,
capital intensity, and demand variance variables to the
profit equation would be appropriate for future study.
[Ref. 18:p." 481]
B. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
If we accept the view that maximization of the market
value of shareholders' equity is the primary objective of
the firm and that financial markets are efficient, then the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) could prove to be useful
in analyzing the relationship between risk and return.
The CAPM was developed by Sharpe , Lintner, and Mossin
(SLM) in the 1960 's in order to evaluate the relationship
between expected return and nondiversifiable risk for
security investments [Ref. 28 :p. 54]. In so doing, they
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found it necessary to make the following simplifying assump-
tions regarding financial markets:
Financial markets are highly efficient because all
relevant information regarding securities is freely
available to all investors;
There are no transaction costs or taxes;
There are negligible restrictions on investment, all
investors can borrow or lend any amount without affect-
ing the interest rate, and there is no risk of
bankruptcy;
No investor is large enough to affect the market price
of securities;
Investors are in general agreement about the likely
performance and risk of individual securities, they
are risk averse, and they reach their decisions using
mean-variance theory; and
Expectations are based on a given uniform investment
period for all investors, approximately one year.
[Ref. 28:p. 54]
This high degree of abstraction was necessary to remove
decision variables which were too numerous and complex to
contend with otherwise.
The CAPM is concerned with two types of investment: a
risk-free security for which return over the holding period
is known with certainty and a market portfolio of common
stocks, represented by all outstanding shares valued at
their combined market prices. The Treasury bill rate serves
as surrogate for the risk-free rate, while indexes such as
Standard S Poor's 500-stock Index, the New York Stock
Exchange Composite Index, or the Wilshire 5000 Index serve
as possible surrogates for the market portfolio.
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Using historical data, SLM calculated returns for each
individual stock and for the market portfolio. Regressing
returns from each individual stock on market return, SLM
obtained a linear relationship referred to as the character-
istic line:
X. = r + g.X,+e,it M 1 mt t
where X . , = rate- of return on i th securityit J
in year t
;
X = rate of return on market portfolio
mt r
in year t;
r " = risk-free rate;
g. = i th security's systematic risk; and
e = residual error about the regression line
Figure 11 indicates that these variables are positively
correlated. Thus, expected returns on individual stocks
increase as expected market return increases .
Beta (g), the slope of the characteristic line, measures
the sensitivity of the return on an individual security to
that of the market. Thus, beta represents the systematic
risk of a stock resulting from security price movements
.
Systematic risk cannot be diversified away because it depends







Source: [Ref. 28:p. 56]
Figure 11. Relationship Between Return on
Stock and Market Return
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in world oil supply, tax reform, and other factors which
affect all stocks.
Unsystematic or avoidable risk is derived from that
portion of variability of an individual stock's return which
is not associated with market movements. Measured by the
dispersion about the characteristic line, unsystematic risk
was found by SLM to account for a substantial part of the
total risk. Van Home observes:
For the typical stock", unsystematic risk or uncertainty
accounts for approximately two-thirds of its total risk.
However, by diversification this kind of risk can be
reduced and even eliminated if diversification is efficient
Therefore, not all of the risk involved in holding a stock
is relevant;, part of it can be diversified away-
Unsystematic risk is reduced at a decreasing rate
toward zero as more randomly selected securities are
added to the portfolio. Various studies suggest that
fifteen to twenty stocks selected randomly are sufficient
to eliminate most of the unsystematic risk of a portfolio.
Thus, a substantial reduction in unsystematic risk can be
achieved with a relatively moderate amount of
diversification. LRef. 28:p. 59]











The CAPM assumes that all unsystematic risk is diversified
away leaving only the unavoidable systematic risk as rele-
vant. As Figure 12 demonstrates, relevant risk is not the
variability of return on an individual stock (total risk)
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but the marginal effect that an individual stock has on





























Number of Securities in Portfolio
Source: LRef. 28:p. 60]
Figure 12. Total, Unsystematic, and
Systematic Risk
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With this assumption, the expected rate of return for
an individual stock is
:
X. = r + (X - r)3
•
1 mi
where X. = expected rate of return on ith security;
r = risk-free rate;




6 . = systematic risk of ith security
Thus, the expected rate of return for an individual stock
is equal to the return required by the market for a risk-
free investment, r, plus a risk premium, (X - r)6..
Beta of an individual security reflects the responsive-
ness of that security's returns to those of the market. Beta
can be measured by the covariance between return on security
i and market return divided by the variance of the probabil-
ity distribution for market return:
n
E









°m Z (X - X ) £
. , m m
i = l
Also under the assumptions of the CAPM , the relationship
between an individual security's expected rate of return and
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its systematic risk, in market equilibrium, is linear.
Figure 13 illustrates this relationship which SLM refer to





Source: [Ref. 2 8 :p. 62]







Thus, the CAPM, framed within certain simplifying
assumptions, implies a linear relationship between return
on investment in a company's stock and the systematic risk
associated with that investment. It further implies that
the expected rate of return for an individual stock is the
combination of the risk free rate plus a premium. This
suggests that the CAPM would be useful in analyzing the
risk-return relationship for investment in government





Betas for the 4 9 companies of Morse and Kramer's
sample were obtained from The Value Line Investment Survey
LRef . 49] Value Line betas are derived from regression
analysis of weekly percent changes in stock prices and the
NYSE Composite Index over a period of five years . These
values are exhibited in Table 7 of Appendix B.
2 Analysis
Means and standard deviations of beta (B) were
computed for the sample of 49 government contractors and
the sub-samples of 36 commercially-oriented firms and 13





























This analysis indicates that the 13 DOD-oriented firms
experienced a higher degree of systematic risk and a
commensurately higher expected rate of return for investors
than the 36 commercially-oriented firms. However, the small
difference between mean betas suggests we should be cautious
about such conclusions. A t-test for differences between
the 13 and 36 indicates that there is no significant dif-
ferences in the mean B's of the two groups.
Comparison of the relative rank of betas and vari-
ance coefficients from regressions of average rate of return
on standard deviation from Section A, suggests that a
possible relationship exists between earnings variation and
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systematic risk. However, the weak statistical evidence
provided by the previous section precludes such a
conclusion
.
Whether earnings variability, investigated in
Section A, is related to beta is an important consideration.
Consequently, standard deviations of return on net worth,
a, from Section A, were regressed on measures of systematic
2
risk, $, from this section. The resulting R values, m
the 0.20 range, for all three samples were too low to indi-
cate any relationships. None of the regression coefficients
were statistically significant.
3 . Results
One of the main purposes for analyzing the risk-
return relationship within the framework of the CAPM was to
compare CAPM results with ROE variance results from Section
A. One method could serve as a test for the other. However,
since the model utilized in Section A was too simple to be
useful, the desired results of this section have been
diminished.
An unexpected result was the discovery of a missing
link between a firm's accounting evaluation of the risk-
return relationship and the securities market treatment of
that relationship. Such a link is not necessary for develop-
ment of a model to evaluate relationships among rate of
return, risk, and leverage for defense contractors similar
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to that developed by Hurdle. However, finding the relation-
ship between beta and earnings variability and obtaining
comparative results would lend credibility to such a model.
The key to solving the problem of relating beta and
earnings variability may lie in the fact that the variance
of return on net worth deals with total risk; while beta
is a measure of systematic risk. Myers suggests separating
the variance of firms' earnings into systematic and unsys-
tematic components
:
Both BKS (Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes) and Rosenberg-
McKibben find earnings volatility to be strongly related
to beta. This is mildly disturbing from a theoretical
point of view, since earnings volatility represents the
total, not the systematic risk of earnings; we would
expect it to be less important than the "accounting
beta" or some other measure of cyclicality. Neverthe-
less, earnings variability corresponds closely to the
popular, intuitive idea of firm risk, and it is a
sensible proxy for cyclicality. Thus, it certainly
belongs on any tentative list of real factors associated
with beta.
However, it is unfortunate that no studies have
separated the variance of firms ' earnings into systematic
and unsystematic components, and tested which component
is more strongly related to beta. If the CAPM is right,
the systematic component ought to be more important.
[Ref. 50]
Myers found cyclicality, for which earnings volatil-
ity is an excellent proxy, to be a major determinant of beta.
However, when he attempted to find a statistic to measure
cyclicality and to specify the relationship between cycli-
cality and beta he found that the relationship is complicated,
cannot be expressed as a simple linear function, and requires
further study.
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C. MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS OE BACKLOG
If, as Hurdle suggests, the risk-return relationship is
explained by several variables in a simultaneous-linear-
equation multiple regression model, then it is plausible
that backlog would be one of those variables which would
collectively describe the market structure for defense
contractors. Backlog consists of those orders which cannot
currently be delivered but will be filled within a later
time period, usually one year.
The monopsonistic condition characteristic of government
contracting makes defense contractors susceptible to govern-
ment demand. Backlog for most' defense contractors would be
the equivalent of Hurdle ' s market share variable . One
difference, however, is that backlog measures future demand,
whereas, market share is historical data.
Computation of backlog involves a substantial amount of
estimating. A typical method for calculating a firm's back-




Previous Year Current Year Current Year
Backlog Ending Backlog Sales Output
Influences such as long-term contracts, partial or complete
terminations, requirements and blanket orders where quanti-
ties are not specified, and seasonal demand make estimating
backlog difficult.
109
Another consideration is that backlog, for some con-
tractors, may account for a small portion of their total
demand. It is anticipated that since several variables
will comprise whatever model is developed, variables such
as sales and sales growth, for example, may account for
the remaining variance of profitability.
Thus, in this section, both total and government backlog
are analyzed to determine the extent to which they explain





Total and government backlog data were collected
from SEC 10K Reports over the period 1976-1984, adjusted
such that it reflects only orders expected to be converted
to sales within one year, and applied to Morse and Kramer's
samples. The resulting sample data, exhibited in Table 6
in Appendix A, average annual backlog, y, were regressed on
standard deviation, x, using an equation of the form:
y = a + bx
Companies for whom backlog has no meaning, for example




(1) Sample of 4 9 Contractors . Sample data for
the 49 firms (37 due to elimination of 12 for whom backlog
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has no meaning) were regressed resulting in the following
values
:
y = -148.7 + 3.18x, R
2
= 0.944
(361.8) (0.42) std error
where
, y = average annual total backlog
x = standard deviation
The computed t statistic for the b coefficient is
:
t = 16 .97
and critical t is
:
t0.025
= 1 ' S6
Since t = 16.97 > t
Q Q25 = 1.96
we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude
for the sample of 49 contractors that the coefficient b is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. We also con-
2 . .
elude from the high value of R that a positively corre-
lated linear relationship exists between average total
backlog and its variability for the sample of 49 contractors
( 2 ) Sample of 36 Commercially-Oriented Firms .
Sample data for the 36 commercially-oriented firms (24 due
to elimination of 12 for whom backlog has no meaning) were
regressed resulting in the following values
:
y = -191.0 + 3.78x, R 2 = 0.958
(1,043.28) (1.56) std error
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The computed t statistic for the b coefficient is
t = 4.94
and critical t • is
V025 = 2 ' 074
Since t = 4.9 4 > t
Q Q 5
= 2.0 7 4,
we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude
for the sample of 36 •commercially-oriented firms that the
coefficient b is statistically significant at the 0.0b
level. This sample is also positively correlated indicating
a linear relationship between total backlog and its
variance
.
(3) Sample of 13 DOD-Qriented Firms . Sample
data were present for all 13 DOD-oriented firms. Thus,
they were regressed with the following results
:
y = -2,841.0 + 4.67x, R 2 = 0.997
(1,916.63) (1.41) std error
The computed t statistic for the b coefficient is:
t = 7.34
and critical t is
:
V025 = 2 ' 201
Since t = 7.34 > t
Q Q25 = 2.201
we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we can con-
clude for the sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms that the
coefficient b is statistically significant at the 0.05
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level. This sample is also positively correlated and indi-
cates a linear relationship between the mean and variance
of total backlog.
b. Government Backlog
(1) Sample of 4 9 Contractors . Sample data for
the 49 firms (37 due to elimination of 12 for whom backlog
has no meaning) was regressed with the following results:
y = 57.72+ 1.97x , R 2 = .683
a g
'
(151.7) (0.25) std error
where y = average annual government backlog




t = 15.75 > Vo25 = 1.96
.'. reject null hypothesis
We conclude that for the sample of 49 contractors the
coefficient b is statistically significant at the 0.05




Sample of 36 Commercially-Oriented Firms .
Regression results are as follows
:
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y = 26.66+2 .21x , R 2 = .912
(100.84) (0.45) std error
t = 10.41





> "0.025 = 2 - 074
.'. reject null hypothesis
We conclude that for the sample of 36 commercially-oriented
firms the coefficient b is statistically significant and
that a linear relationship is indicated.
(3) Sample of 13 DOD-Oriented Firms . Regres-
sion results are as follows:





(708 .33) (0.76) std error




-" 5 ' 2 >
"0.025 = 2 ' 2
.*. reject null hypothesis
We conclude that for this sample the coefficient b is
significant and that a linear relationship is indicated.
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3 . Results
Statistical findings are summarized as follows
Sample of 4 9 firms:
Total backlog:
y = -148.7 + 3.18x, R
2
= 0.944
(361.8) (0.42) std error
Government backlog
:




(151.7) (0.25) std error
Sample of 36 commercially-oriented firms:
Total backlog:
y = -191.0 +• 3 .78x, R 2 = 0.958
(1,043.28) (1.56) std error
Government backlog:





(100.84) (0.45) std error
Sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms:
Total backlog:
y = -2,841.0 + 4.67x, R
2
= 0.997
(1,916.63) (1.41) std error
Government backlog:




(708.33) (0.76) std error
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These results coincide with a priori expectations.
2The high values of R were somewhat surprising. These are
probably due to the affects of autocorrelation which is
expected to be present but which was not analyzed.
The coefficient signs for government backlog are
positive again corresponding to a priori expectations .
The negative intercept coefficients derived from the total
backlog regressions were not expected. Note, however, that
they are all small relative to their standard errors , so
that all equations pass through the origin. We can con-
clude from this observation that the high values of the
errors of estimate are another cause
.
The results of the government backlog regressions
are particularly encouraging because they explain a very
high percentage of the differences in backlog among defense
contractors. This would indicate that inclusion of a
backlog variable in a model similar to that which Hurdle
developed may explain some of the differences in corporate
earnings among defense contractors
.
In order to see if backlog could explain a portion
of the differences in rates of return, average rate of
return was regressed on the standard deviation of backlog.
2However, the resulting R values, in the 0.20 range, for
all three samples were too low to be useful. None of the
regression coefficients were statistically significant.
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This suggests the need for additional variables to explain
the differences.
Thus, we conclude that, in a model such as that
developed by Hurdle adapted to the government contracting
environment, inclusion of a backlog variable as a proxy
for demand or market share should explain a substantial
portion of the differences in rate of return among
contractors
.
D. MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS OF FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM
ELEMENTS
The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) is the publication
which summarizes decisions approved by the Secretary of
Defense for program go-ahead. [Ref. 51 J The FYDP provides
manpower and costs associated with functions or projects
accomplished in the past or to be accomplished in the
future to support our national defense goals . These
functions and projects, referred to as program elements,
are aggregated within ten programs
:
1. Strategic Forces




4. Airlift and Sealift
5. Guard and Reserve Forces
6. Research and Development
7
.
Central Supply and Maintenance
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8. Training, Medical and Other General Personnel
Activities
9. Administrative and Associated Activities
10. Support of Other Nations
Cost associated with Research and Development (RSD) is
of interest here. The value to corporate managers of
future demand forecasting is well known. It assists them
in decisions such as production scheduling, inventory
management, pricing, and primarily, investment. Commer-
cial firms rely on econometric forecasters for such
analyses. Defense contractors rely on RSD planning
summaries published by the component services of DOD and
typically perform their own analyses .
Variations in DOD ' s funding of specific RSD programs
may serve as a proxy for inherent program risk. Thus,
average RSD program element budgeted costs are regressed
on their standard deviations for selected programs over
the period FY 1976-FY 1984.
1 . Methodology
RSD funding data for 27 selected program elements
were collected from The Five Year Defense Program
Historical Summary and Program Detail FY 1962-FY 1984
[Ref. 51] for the period FY 1976-FY 1984. Criteria for
program element selection included: program continuity
over the period of consideration, program applicability
to our sample of defense contractors, and magnitude of
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funding. Means and standard deviations of sample data are
exhibited in Table 8 of Appendix C. Mean RSD funding is
regressed on the standard deviation of the funding.
2 . Analysis
Average RSD funding, y , and standard deviation, x
are approximated by an equation of the form:
y = a + bx
P
with the following results





where y = average annual RSD program funding
x = standard deviation
The computed t statistic for the b coefficient is
:
t = 17.48
and critical t is
:
V025 = 2 ' 06
Since t = 17.48 > t n noc = 2.06
u . u i o
we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude
that the coefficient b is statistically significant at the
2 . .0.05 level. The R value indicates that a positively
correlated linear relationship exists between RSD program
funding and its variability.
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3 . Results
Results of the regression coincide with a priori
expectations and support the theory that variance of
program funding serves as proxy for intrinsic program risk
Mean-variance analysis of aggregations of program
elements applicable to a particular company should yield
an overall measure of the risk inherent in developing
such programs. Similar analyses could be performed on
aggregates of program elements for comparisons of particu-
lar industries , for example between the aerospace , elec-
tronics
,
ordnance, or shipbuilding industries.
Thus, we conclude that inclusion of a variable to
describe program variance in a model such as that devel-
oped by Hurdle may also explain a portion of the dif-_




VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The overall purpose of this study was to analyze and
measure, if possible, the relationship between defense con-
tractor risk and rate of return. In so doing, we explored
significant legislation, studies, and policies related to
government contractor profitability and risk; observed, from
the perspective of both the government and the contractor,
the government contracting environment; analyzed the concept
of risk; and empirically assessed four possible measures of
risk: variability of return on net worth, stock prices,
backlog, and RED funding.
We noted that Fisher and Hall's study, Risk and the
Aerospace Rate of Return
,
provided important empirical
methods and was a similar attempt to analyze and measure
risk for the aerospace industry.
DFAIR pointed us in the direction of concentrating on
the interrelation among profit, financing and contract
pricing policies rather than the usual comparison of profit.
Gloria Hurdle, in her paper, "Leverage, Risk, Market
Structure .and Profitability", provided us with an excellent
model which could be adapted to parameters associated with
government contracting; thereby providing us with a tool to
evaluate the integrated relationships of profit, risk,
leverage, and market structure among defense contractors.
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Adaptation of such a model to the defense industry is a good
area for further study.
Viewing the risk elements involved in government con-
tracting from the perspective of both government and the
contractor, has emphasized the need for equitable risk
sharing
.
On the basis of statistical findings, we concluded that
variability of rate of return does not account for a sizeable
enough portion of the differences in return to stand alone as
a model. Additional variables must be added to the model.
However, we also concluded, on the basis of statistical sig-
nificance found for variance of return on net worth in the
sample of 13 DOD-oriented firms, that standard deviation of
return on net worth is a suitable proxy for total risk
.
Evaluation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
yielded substantial empirical evidence from previous studies
that beta represents systematic, or nondiversif iable , risk
for a firm's stock as measured by the variance in stock
prices. Because there is substantial empirical evidence
regarding beta as an appropriate measure of systematic risk,
it could serve as a test for the variance of return on net
worth measure. Also, being able to relate beta to the
standard deviation of return on net worth would be worth-
while, although presently difficult. This also provides an
area for further study.
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The mean-variance analysis of backlog resulted in the
conclusion that backlog could serve as a suitable proxy
for demand or market share. , However, it was also determined
that backlog would not stand alone as a suitable model
either. Additional variables must be added to backlog in
a multi-variable model to explain correctly the relationships
among profit and risk.
Similarly, we found that variations in DOD ' s funding of
specific RSD programs could serve as a suitable proxy for
inherent program risk and demand variance
.
What becomes abundantly clear from this study is that by
focusing on the peculiar market structure of the defense
industry, it should be possible to adapt a model such as
Hurdle's "Leverage, Risk, Market Structure, and Profitabil-
ity" model to describe these relationships for the defense
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